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Structural reform
ecoNomIc PolIcY reformS IN tHe lee mYuNG-BaK aDmINIStratIoN
By Tony Michell
Policy and Global crisis
Between winning the election in December 2007 
and taking office in February 2008, Lee Myung-
bak and his administration sketched out a massive 
reform program that would potentially affect every 
aspect of Korea’s economic and social life, from the 
organization of ministries, through macroeconomic 
policies, privatization, taxation, education reform, 
and the restructuring of policies affecting land de-
velopment from zoning to massive infrastructure 
projects intended to jump start the Korean economy. 
Part of this policy was aimed at rolling back 10 years 
of so-called progressive government, and part was to 
try to change the way the Korean economy worked 
by opening much more of it to private enterprise 
and market forces.
This article, rather than providing a comprehensive 
overview of the structural issues, addresses a select 
number of issues that may be viewed as characteriz-
ing the Lee Myung-bak administration’s main policy 
themes. The approach is largely chronological be-
cause much of the battle plan did not survive contact 
with the enemy, but the measure of the administra-
tion is how it has adapted to new circumstances and 
to opposition to its core economic policies.
Korea is exposed to the global crisis that is now 
engulfing the world, just as any other economy. 
President Lee warned Koreans early into his term 
in office that Korea faced a severe test coming 
from overseas, but there was no immediate action. 
Koreans, like the citizens of many countries, did not 
see the connection between what was still seen in 
February 2008 as America’s subprime problem and 
the export-led economy of Korea. The crisis exposed 
in a matter of months every weakness in every 
company and every sector and every economy that 
might have been worked out over a matter of years. 
The questions are whether the policies adopted by 
the Lee Myung-bak administration during its first 
year in office were appropriate and whether it is 
fully using the experience of the past.
The first thing to state is that the global crisis has 
almost no resemblance to the so-called Korean IMF 
crisis of 1997–98. In 1997–98, the Korean domestic 
economy collapsed as the chaebol failed to pay back 
their bank loans, dragging down the banks as well. 
In the last days of 1997, foreign exchange reserves 
were exhausted. The exchange rate of the won to 
the dollar fell from 900 to almost 2,000, and imme-
diately exports grew while the domestic economy 
continued to contract.
In 2008–09 the issue was the collapse of exports 
driven by the collapse of the world economy, and 
Korea’s domestic economy declined later. Today, 
the domestic economy is expected to experience a 
fairly shallow recession, with the export economy 
already experiencing a massive contraction. Un-
like 1997–98, many Korean companies now are 
cash rich with relatively low debt-equity ratios. 
The recovery scenario is based on exports leading, 
and domestic demand recovery following, with 
infrastructure investment coming close behind at 
the back end of 2009. Lagging sectors are likely 
to be semiconductors and construction (especially 
domestic and commercial building).1
1. For an official statistical comparison with a financial slant, see “The Korean Economy: 1997 vs. 2008,” Economic Bulletin 
(Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Republic of Korea) 30, no. 12 (December 2008): 2–6, http://english.mosf.go.kr/public/
direction_list.php?sect=pubs_economic.
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The strengths that Korea’s previous experience 
brings to the present situation are:
•	 Korea	Asset	Management	Corporation	 (KAM-
CO)	 is	 an	 excellent	vehicle	 for	handling	 toxic	
assets	in	the	financial	sector;
•	 Seminationalization	of	weaker	banks	is	still	partly	
in	place;
•	 Companies	have	kept	their	leverage	low	after	a	
disastrous	experience	in	1997–98;	and
•	 Exposure	to	outside	toxic	financial	instruments	
and	frauds	has	been	limited.
Campaign Vision: 747 Thinking
The	 president	was	 elected	 on	 a	 reform	program	
that	was	 aimed	 at	 bringing	Korea	 a	 new	 era	 of	
growth.	Koreans	worried	 that	 their	economic	po-
tential	growth	rate	was	slowing	rapidly	and	that	a	
3–4	percent	growth	rate	of	gross	domestic	product	
(GDP)	would	allow	Korea	to	neither	maintain	 its	
position	 in	 the	 league	of	world	economic	powers	
nor	continue	 the	growth	of	 the	standard	of	 living	
up	to	the	level	of	advanced	countries.	President	Lee	
had	been	elected	as	the	“business	president”	on	the	
“747	platform,”	which	proposed	 that	 the	 country	
could	grow	at	7	percent	annually,	per	capita	income	
could	reach	$40,000,	and	Korea	could	become	the	
seventh-largest	economy	in	the	world.	Although	this	
was	 admittedly	 a	 long-term	vision,	 the	 president	
initially	said	that	this	would	be	achievable	within	
his	five-year	term	as	president,	but	apologists	stated	
later	that	this	was	a	plan	to	be	achieved	by	2017.
The	747	concept	reveals	some	of	the	flaws	in	the	
thinking	of	the	group	that	surrounded	President	Lee	
Myung-bak.	The	group	that	emerged	as	the	strongest	
contenders	for	control	of	the	president’s	thinking	in-
cluded	Kang	Man-soo,	who	was	appointed	minister	
of	strategy	and	finance.	To	achieve	7	percent	growth,	
the	economy	was	going	to	need	both	domestic	and	
external	drivers.	Exports	would	need	to	race	faster,	
and	the	domestic	economy	would	need	to	positively	
hum.	When	the	group	of	advisers	reflected	on	what	
engine	was	 big	 enough	 to	 accelerate	 a	maturing	
economy,	which	all	historic	experience	should	have	
told	them	could	not	be	done,	they	came	up	with	the	
idea	of	a	canal	 from	Seoul	 to	Busan.	This	would	
make	the	construction	industry	surge	with	energy,	
make	Hyundai	Construction	and	other	construction	
companies	 in	 bankruptcy	 suddenly	 valuable,	 and	
bring	 rising	 land	prices	 and	 economic	 activity	 to	
a	corridor	that	had	not	seen	much	growth	for	one	
to	two	decades.	Initial	claims	that	it	would	reduce	
transport	costs	were	largely	abandoned	in	the	face	of	
transport	experts’	insistence	that	it	would	not.
At	 the	 same	 time,	Minister	Kang’s	 thinking	was	
that the won,	which	had	been	steadily	strengthening	
for	several	years,	should	be	forced	to	drop	from	its	
range	of	920–950	to	the	U.S.	dollar	to	about	1,000,	
where	the	won/yen	exchange	rate	would	be	about	1	
yen	to	10	won,	which	was	felt	to	be	the	optimum	for	
Korea	to	compete	against	Japan.	Although	revers-
ing	the	strengthening	of	the	won	would	lower	the	
per	capita	GDP	short	term,	it	would	raise	the	GDP	
growth	rate.
But	how	could	Korea	become	the	seventh-largest	
economy	in	the	world?	It	seems	that	 the	advisers	
were	not	aware	when	they	coined	the	slogan	that	
Korea	had	 slipped	 from	10th	place	 to	13th	place	
as	Russia,	 India,	 and	Brazil	 raced	past.	Even	 so,	
however	you	run	 the	numbers	on	 the	back	of	 the	
envelope,	the	only	way	Korea	could	get	to	seventh	
was	to	add	the	24	million	North	Koreans	to	the	49	
million	South	Koreans	and	also	speed	up	the	North	
Korean	economy.	This	was	not	going	to	happen,	in	
their	view,	unless	North	Korea	collapsed	and	was	
absorbed	by	South	Korea;	 and	 the	group’s	North	
Korea	policy	was	clearly	tinged	by	this	concept.	In	
this	thinking,	although	it	was	never	explicitly	stated,	
unification	was	to	be	not	an	abstract	goal	but	some-
thing	whose	time	could	come	within	the	five-year	
presidential	term.	Any	North-South	cooperation	that	
delayed	the	collapse	of	the	North	was	not	really	in	
line	with	this	hope,	and	this	included	the	Kaesong	
industrial	estate.	President	Lee	was	to	speak	on	the	
subject	of	unification	with	more	assurance	than	his	
two	predecessors,	who	had	expected	 it	 to	happen	
on	a	mutually	negotiated	basis	and	would	not	be	
the	“acquisition”	that	President	Lee’s	group	nursed	
in	their	souls.
The	president	and	his	advisers	also	wished	to	create	
a	 smaller	 government	 by	merging	 and	 rearrang-
ing	ministries,	privatizing	state-owned	assets,	and	
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selling the indebted companies—such as Woori, 
Daewoo Shipbuilding and Engineering, Hyundai 
Construction, and others—that had been under state 
bank ownership since the crisis of the 1990s. The 
retreat from holding assets would help reinvigorate 
the economy. Corporate tax cuts would stimulate the 
private sector, with income tax cuts following. Penal 
taxes on selling real estate would be removed.
High Hopes and Early Disillusionment
The year 2008 opened with expectations of a high 
level of economic growth. Year on year the economy 
was performing at its best for eight quarters in 
the first quarter of the year, at 5.6 percent, having 
sustained a rising note during the last two quarters 
of 2007, and confidence was high that the new 
president, who took office on 25 February 2008, 
would take the country’s business to a new level. 
The country was thought to be immune to what was 
still seen as a U.S. subprime mortgage crisis, while 
the heights that commodity prices would reach by 
July were still unforeseen. Monthly exports were 
growing at 20–30 percent year on year.
The administration recognized that part of the 
stimulus to the economy could be achieved through 
macro policy but that much of the underwriting of 
growth would require a fairly massive legislative 
program. This could not be attempted until a new 
National Assembly, to be elected in April 2008, was 
seated in June because until then the Lee adminis-
tration would not have a majority. Developing the 
legislation would take until at least September, and 
a raft of reform legislation would come into effect 
in January 2009.
The task of identifying and preparing this reform 
legislation was given to a new Council on National 
Competitiveness reporting directly to the president 
and led by the distinguished economist, SaKong Il. 
This council was to work on creating a business-
friendly environment. In particular it was recognized 
that the patchwork of legislation from 45 years of 
rapid growth needed comprehensive reform. In July 
SaKong pointed to the need for comprehensive 
laws:
For some regulatory reforms, more than one 
relevant law needs to be revised. Ideally, 
therefore, if we have a special comprehen-
sive law, deregulation can be done more 
efficiently. However, we have to deal with 
legislative reality in which persuading the 
National Assembly to pass such a law will 
not be easy. Nonetheless, we will try to per-
suade the National Assembly to legislate a 
number of comprehensive laws in specific 
areas, so that deregulation in these areas can 
be expedited.2
Core to the 747 program was the quick implemen-
tation of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement 
(KORUS FTA), which was languishing in both 
the Korean National Assembly and U.S. Congress, 
because core to Lee’s entire global strategy was to 
park Korea in the U.S. parking lot, in alliance with 
Japan, a political goal that implicitly clashed with 
the need to cooperate with China, which now took 
23 percent of Korea’s exports. Almost certainly in 
the minds of the advisers, nearly all in their late 60s, 
was the belief that the U.S. economy still took closer 
to 40 percent of Korea’s exports as it had done in 
the 1990s, when most of them last held office, and 
not the 10–11 percent that flowed from Korea to the 
United States in 2008.
The one thing that held up the KORUS FTA, the 
president was advised, was the issue of admitting 
U.S. beef, and, in a hurry to push things along, the 
president agreed on his visit to the United States in 
April 2008 to accept the beef under a slightly lower 
standard of supervision than a number of other coun-
tries. No one present at the Korea-U.S. talks could 
have had any conception of how strong the public 
reaction to this would be. It is important for the 
U.S. side to realize that this was not an antiforeign 
movement but a spontaneous explosion of public 
discontent with the style and program of the new 
government, in which the majority of the Korean 
people felt they were treated like employees of Ko-
rea Inc. and not citizens of the Republic of Korea. 
The canal program, which threatened to overtake the 
beef issue as a matter of discontent, also disturbed 
2. “SERI Interview: Presidential Council on National Competitiveness: Chairman SaKong Il,” SERI Quarterly, July 2008, 
www.seriworld.org/sq/wldQArticle.html?mcd=2000&psq=20080202&ssq=&atseq=36.
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every notion of what made sense for the nation. The 
protests finally faded after almost two months, with 
some backing down by the government, but it was 
clear that the administration had lost the confidence 
of the population.
The strength of the protest, while not overthrow-
ing the government, made an administration al-
ready nervous about answering criticism from its 
electorate even more inclined to be defensive and 
nontransparent, a bad precondition for the govern-
ment and the country as they approached the worst 
global crisis that anyone alive in 2008 had faced. 
Despite a poor showing by the official opposition in 
the April 2008 elections, the administration has, to 
date, been unable to muster its full paper majority in 
the National Assembly, and passage of the KORUS 
FTA by the Korean assembly is now set for May 
2009 at the earliest. Hence SaKong’s cautious note 
in July 2008, cited above, and hence the fact that, 
after one year of power, almost none of the legisla-
tion that was proposed in January–February 2008 
is near the statute book.
At the same time, Minister Kang’s manipulation of 
the won had upset the business community, causing 
massive losses among many exporters who were 
hedged to cover rises in the value of the won, but 
actually had counterparty hedges (the so-called 
KIKO and other derivatives) that forced them to 
pay the banks if the won headed south. This created 
considerable pain among small- and medium-size 
exporters. The effect has been to make Koreans, al-
ways more unsure about the future of their economy 
than outside observers, much more prone to panics 
and rumors than might otherwise have been the case 
as Korea entered the global crisis.
Inflation and Recession, May 2008–January 2009
From May 2008 to the end of the year the Korean 
economy climbed a speculative mountain and then 
slid down the cliff of economic slowdown. This is a 
phenomenon illustrated in almost all data, from out-
put to inflation, but it is well illustrated by Figure 1, 
which shows the long-term monthly performance of 
exports and imports. The reduction in the value of the 
won also came at exactly the wrong moment in terms 
of inflation because even at fixed exchange rates all 
the imported inputs into the Korean economy soared 
in price, but, coupled with the speculative peaks to 
July 2008 and a falling won, it meant an impending 
problem for every part of the Korean economy from 
households to banks and manufacturers. In addition, 
it created a current account deficit. Fortunately the 
collapse of world commodity prices came in time 
to save the Korean economy from inflationary self-
destruction, and a new set of problems confronted 
Korea’s policymakers.
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Figure 1: Performance of Exports and Imports in 
Korea, 2002–early 2009
Source: Ministry of Knowledge Economy, Seoul, 2009.
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The immediate legacy, which weighed heavily on 
the won, was the current account deficit run-up 
when oil was rising toward $150 per barrel. On a 
monthly basis, as prices and imports fell in parallel 
with exports, a current account surplus returned. Still 
Korea ran a negative balance of about $12 billion 
for the first time since 1998, and this weighed heav-
ily on the won. The main problem during the last 
four months of 2008 and ongoing in 2009 remained 
building confidence in the won.
In each successive quarter of 2008, growth was 
lower, but not until October did exports cease their 
relentless year-on-year growth and begin to decline. 
Figure 1 shows that exports peaked in July 2008, but 
by January 2009 exports were back at the level of 
2005, temporarily wiping out three years of export-
led growth.
Low Expectations, Spring 2009
A summary of the achievements of the Lee adminis-
tration in its first year is not very positive. In terms of 
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macroeconomic policy, the stability of the economy 
had been weakened prior to the full fury of the crisis 
that hit Korea on the collapse of Lehman Brother on 
15 September 2008, while the business-friendly leg-
islative reform was not yet on the statute book. Inter 
alia, the impending sale of Daewoo Shipbuilding and 
Engineering and government holdings in banks had 
to be postponed as the Korean stock market index, 
KOSPI, slid from around 1800 to around 1000 and 
the ability of the major Korean companies to fund 
leveraged takeovers disappeared. At the same time, 
in terms of handling the domestic effects of the cri-
sis, the steady shoveling of relatively small amounts 
of money by the Bank of Korea and the Ministry of 
Strategy and Finance through existing mechanisms 
was well done. Further, as described below, in Au-
gust 2008, the president announced a new vision 
of a green and great Korea that proposed a major 
additional engine of economic and social policy and 
that could replace the ill-conceived canal.
Korea faces two economic challenges, one from 
internal economic players and one from external 
players. On the whole, Koreans are much more nega-
tive about their economy than the external players 
are; they are more likely to imagine forthcoming 
crises without adding up the numbers; and of course 
they are more likely to engage in foreign exchange 
hoarding, which has almost the same effect as capi-
tal flight in the short term but can be more easily 
reversed. Foreign players tend to look at the macro 
numbers and become nervous if there is a current 
account deficit; believe macro forecasts that have 
a limited basis in Korean reality; and look at other 
macro parallels—of which the most significant are 
the very high ratio to GDP of Korean household 
debt, ranking in the top five in the world alongside 
the United Kingdom and Australia, and the high 
amount of overseas foreign exchange borrowing 
by Korean banks—without looking at the cause 
and the channel.
These two debt figures are important because they 
have special Korean features. The level of house-
hold debt is curious given the lack of 90 percent 
mortgages that would explain it in the other two 
cases. It seems to be related to the use, which is 
exceptionally high, of credit cards in the economy 
for normal transactions and the need to borrow to 
pay for education. As for the amount of short-term 
foreign exchange borrowing, the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) has demonstrated that about half 
is related to the shipbuilding industry and the other 
half to more normal business practices with some 
carry trade activities related to the yen. In addition, 
more than half of the debt is handled by branches 
of foreign banks in Korea, which means defaults by 
lenders become the problem of foreign banks and 
not domestic banks.
From late November 2008, when UBS predicted 
that Korea would experience –3 percent growth 
for 2009, until February 2009 when the IMF pre-
dicted –4 percent, the country’s decision makers 
were in denial. No one in Korea realized that the 
global economic collapse could be so fast, least 
of all the group around the president, members of 
which were still dreaming of higher and not lower 
growth. Kang Man-soo used the ministry’s machin-
ery to discourage professors and journalists from 
making pessimistic forecasts and was menaced by 
an anonymous blogger, Minerva, who culturally 
linked the demonstrations of May to the decline in 
economic growth.
Only with the appointment of Yoon Jeung-hyun as 
minister of strategy and finance in February 2009 
could a new realistic look come over the govern-
ment. Yoon, unlike his predecessor, had held office 
under President Roh Moo-hyun and brought a new 
realism to macro policy, being prepared to counte-
nance realistic estimates of short-term economic 
contraction. “Despite these challenges, the gov-
ernment will stay calm and take action as initially 
planned,” he could say as he announced the possi-
bility of negative growth of at least 5 percent in the 
first quarter (Figure 2). His major contribution was 
the proposal for a new major stimulus plan that may 
include radical innovations such as food stamps, 
while working with all actors in the economy to 
make progress on reform legislation.
Fears about a March 2009 crisis pushed the won 
below 1,500 in the final half of February 2009. 
The degree to which Korea is prone to rumors 
was captured during the second half of 2008 by 
the blogger, Minerva, whose doomsday forecasts 
were widely given credence. This was partly due 
to the parallel rumor that Minerva was a senior 
government or administration official and not the 
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untrained IT specialist he apparently was. The first 
alleged crisis was the September 2008 crisis, where 
the projected failure of foreigners to roll over their 
won-denominated bond holdings would cause a 
foreign exchange crisis. What this September crisis 
rumor lacked was any quantification of numbers. 
The worst-case scenario that not a single bondholder 
would reinvest would strip only about $10 billion 
out of Korea’s foreign exchange reserves, which at 
the time stood at more than $210 billion. In fact, 
foreigners were net buyers, and Koreans were the 
sellers and dollar hoarders.
The same lack of quantification drove the notion of 
a March 2009 crisis, which was based on Japanese 
banks’ not rolling over loans as they closed their 
books. Again the total amount involved was about 
$10 billion, only about 5 percent of Korea’s foreign 
exchange reserves in February 2009. In essence the 
won was being driven by Korean players who did 
not calculate the real probability and impact of their 
predictions. At the time of writing (5 March 2009) 
the expectation of a strengthening won in April, 
just as it strengthened again in later November, is 
reasonable, but we must also expect that the Korean 
market will continue to generate imaginary future 
crises that create real waves as Koreans speculate 
against the crisis. The sentiment grew worse in late 
February with concern looming over a second wave 
of global financial market trouble starting from 
eastern Europe.
Thus, most of the gloom came from doubts about the 
sustainability of the won rather than the economic 
fundamentals. A fierce debate was occurring over the 
impact of the fact that the won is not fully convert-
ible: The majority of Korean financial institutions 
believed that the fact that the won was still not fully 
convertible and was still focused on the won/dollar 
window was restricting the global demand for won. 
Successive administrations believed that, if the won 
were freely convertible, capital flight would pull the 
won down. Foreigners thought that opening the won 
would increase the global demand for the Korean 
currency and deepen the market. In all this debate, 
typical Koreans were more pessimistic than the 
foreigners who were active in the market.
One of Korea’s strengths is that it has an excellent 
mechanism—in the form of KAMCO—for handling 
toxic assets. KAMCO in the 1990s and early 2000 
played a major role in removing bad debt from the 
nation’s financial institutions. KAMCO’s special 
strength is that it is an intermediary, not a long-term 
holder of bad assets. In the past it has packaged 
portfolios and resold them, unlike the Chinese as-
set management companies like CINTA that tend to 
hold the assets. KAMCO is thus able to turn over 
its capital relatively fast and repurchase more bad 
assets without government recapitalization.
Thus KAMCO swung into action on behalf of the 
small savings banks of Korea that had become heav-
ily involved in project finance of projects that were 
suddenly unviable in the second half of 2008, and 
KAMCO is ready to vacuum up bad debt from the 
commercial banks. This means that there is never 
much doubt about the pricing of bad assets from 
the bank administrator’s point of view. Further, 
most Korean bad assets still have a real estate base 
because of the conservatism of the banks where 
corporate lending was concerned. Consumer debt is 
of a different quality, and the country signally failed 
to handle the consumer debt crisis as well as Taiwan 
handled a similar crisis at about the same time.
Recovery for Korea in 2009, or for that matter in 
2010, rests on the recovery of other economies. 
Korea is, like Germany, Japan, Taiwan, and China, 
a major exporter. Unlike the other four, Korea tends 
to run a marginal current account surplus, which is 
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largely a reflection of the imbalance in trade with 
Japan rather than the need to import raw materials 
that is common to all the exporting economies. Is 
it credible that there will be enough growth in the 
world to allow Korea’s exports to recover? During 
2008, 70 percent of Korea’s exports went to develop-
ing countries, including China. The assumptions are 
that China will continue to grow at 6–7 percent in 
2009, and slightly faster in 2010, that this will pull 
Korean exports in, albeit not at such a fast rate, and 
that under most scenarios much of the developing 
world will grow in 2009, again modestly increasing 
potential exports to those destinations. In this, much 
hangs on the price of oil, which needs to be above 
$50 per barrel to ensure that oil producers continue 
to invest in their infrastructure plans and to subsidize 
their populations.
Neither 6–7 percent growth in China nor $50 per 
barrel oil will set the world aright, but they would set 
a floor under Korean exports and are likely to create 
a sense of a reviving economy that will underwrite 
Korean consumer expenditure. They will come close 
to offsetting declining demand in the United States, 
Japan, and the EC by the end of 2009.
 
The expectation is that in the third quarter of 2009 
exports will be close to their 2008 level and that in 
the fourth quarter exports will exceed their reduced 
base in the fourth quarter of 2008, bringing back 
growth and domestic confidence. Even consumer 
expenditure may be higher in the final quarter of 
2009 than in the corresponding quarter of 2008. This 
makes the recovery “technical” as much as produc-
ing real growth, but it begins a virtuous cycle that 
leads to very substantial growth in 2010 (not yet 
factored in by forecasters in the IMF and Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development 
[OECD]), and that should give Korea a growth rate 
of 4–5 percent and a healthy balance of payments 
surplus, which in turn will presumably lead to a 
rise in value of the won. The worst case appears to 
be that the recovery will be delayed from the third 
quarter to the fourth quarter. Such a delay would 
move Korea’s 2009 GDP downward from –1 percent 
to –2 percent. No recovery in the final quarter would 
result in the IMF forecast of –4 percent being close 
to accurate. The task of domestic policy therefore 
became short-term stimulus and strengthening con-
fidence in the won.
Interplay of International and Domestic 
Sectors and an economic Stimulus Plan
It is often said that exports represent 60 percent of 
the Korean economy. More accurately, during the 
past few years, the growth of exports has contrib-
uted 60–70 percent of Korea’s growth. In terms of 
the actual composition, the export sector represents 
only about 20 percent of the composition of Ko-
rea’s GDP; but, growing much faster, exports have 
recently contributed close to 60–70 percent of the 
country’s growth.
During the past few years, the domestic economy 
and the external economy have run at very different 
rates, as shown in Figure 3, which compares the 
quarterly growth of private expenditure with GDP 
quarterly data. It can be seen that during the credit 
card crisis of 2002–03 private consumption was 
also negative.
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The collapse of consumer expenditure in the final 
quarter of 2008 was faster than expected. This 
persuaded Minister of Finance and Strategy Yoon 
that a direct consumer stimulus aimed not at all 
segments of the population, as was done in Taiwan 
and Japan, but especially at lower-income groups 
would be most beneficial. A bill has been introduced 
into the National Assembly that would create both 
food stamps and shopping coupons. Such a bill, if 
it overcomes the objections that the money may 
not be spent but will be saved, could put additional 
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purchasing power in the hands of consumers by the 
end of April 2009.
How to create a suitable stimulus for the economy 
remains an issue for the government. The circle 
around President Lee sought to reinstate the canal 
plan and inserted into the 2009 budget (Table 1) an 
inordinate amount of expense on river improvement, 
although gradually rail and other infrastructure im-
provements have been proposed.
Although President Lee was to claim in February 
that Korea had spent 2.5 percent of its GDP, about 
$25 billion, on economic stimulus, this clearly was 
no more than minimal domestic garbage disposal. 
This task should not be treated lightly because it has 
kept Korea Inc. functioning smoothly. However, 
if 2.5 percent of GDP is required to handle waste, 
another 2.5 percent to 5 percent is needed to create 
growth, and this is now being proposed by Minister 
Yoon.
Great and Green
In his independence day speech on 15 August 2008, 
President Lee launched his conception of a green and 
great Korea. This was to develop into an independent 
50 trillion won funding initiative that would create 
a new engine of growth.
Although Lee Myung-bak has always been an envi-
ronmental advocate, the green and great Korea con-
cept is a major policy innovation. Moreover, Korea 
is one of the best bases for producing new green 
products. President Lee Myung-bak’s administration 
has made a major policy innovation in recognizing 
that the green world can be a world of significant 
opportunity for Korea and that Korea can become 
green and great. This has begun the urgent task of 
preparing Korea for Kyoto II. Since the creation of 
the Kyoto treaty, Korea’s greenhouse emissions have 
doubled while most OECD countries struggled to 
Table 1: Budget Expenditures by the Republic of Korea, 2008 and 2009 
 
Budget items 
2008 
2009  
(proposed by 
government) 
2009  
(fixed by  
National Assembly) 
Won, 
trillions 
Increase 
(%) 
Won, 
Trillions 
Increase 
(%) 
Won, 
Trillions 
Increase 
(%) 
Research and development 11.1 13.0 12.3 10.8 12.4 11.5 
Industry, small- and medium-
size enterprises, energy 
12.6 0.3 15.3 21.1 16.2 28.5 
Social overhead capital 19.6 69.3 24.8 26.7 24.7 26.0 
Agriculture, fisheries, food 16.0 0.3 17.1 7.1 16.7 4.8 
Health and welfare 67.7 10.2 74.6 10.3 74.7 10.4 
Education 35.6 15.7 38.7 8.8 38.3 7.7 
Culture, sports, and tourism 3.3 11.7 3.4 3.7 3.5 6.7 
Environment 4.5 10.6 4.9 10.1 5.1 14.1 
Defense (normal accounting) 26.6 8.8 28.7 7.8 28.6 7.3 
Union, foreign affairs 2.8 15.6 2.9 3.7 3.0 5.1 
Public system and security 11.7 7.1 12.3 5.1 12.3 5.6 
Normal public administration 45.9 8.6 48.9 6.5 48.7 6.1 
Total expenditures 257.2 8.5 283.8 10.4 284.5 10.6 
 
Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance. 
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prevent their emissions from increasing. Korea is 
consequently now one of the top seven polluters in 
the world although its contribution to total planetary 
greenhouse gas emissions is not large. Under Kyoto 
II, Korea will need to sign emission constraints. 
Thus, this overcrowded country must change its 
ways by seizing the opportunity.
With all the distractions of a global economic crisis 
and oil falling from almost $150 per barrel in July 
2008 to $30–$40 five months later, the dynamic of 
becoming green and great may seem less urgent. 
But in the future this two-to-three-year breathing 
space for the planet and for the world economy may 
be seen as the perfect gift to mankind’s future and 
a chance for Korea to get ahead. During the past 
decade the standard of living of about 3.5 billion 
inhabitants out of the 6.5 billion on the planet has 
increased remarkably. No longer is wealth concen-
trated in the hands of the one billion Americans, 
Japanese, and Europeans. Korean exporters had 
been major beneficiaries of that development. But 
the capacity of the planet to support such a level of 
affluence under the brown economy is zero. What 
is necessary is a new era of sustainable growth 
that requires everyone to reconsider how they use 
resources.
Korea has some of the best manufacturing tech-
niques in the world. Whatever a green planet needs, 
Koreans can produce it. The problem is that no one 
knows what the next generation of green industries 
will look like and what products it will use. Will 
cars be predominantly battery driven, hybrids, or 
powered by oxygen or hydrogen? Is solar power, 
wind power, or tidal and geothermal power going to 
be the major provider of household energy needs? 
Can we retrofit buildings to be sustainable, or must 
we redesign buildings and cities to be modest or 
minimal emitters? How can a building of 100 stories 
be energy efficient? How will aircraft design change 
to provide both mobility and low consumption of 
resources?
One of Korea’s problems is that its research and 
development is spread very thinly and in-depth 
knowledge is concentrated in a few areas. A na-
tionalistic pride continues to make Koreans want to 
invent their own technology and, therefore, ignore 
good existing technology.3
For all these reasons the need for a green dialogue 
between foreign companies and the Korean govern-
ment and Korean businesses and educators is urgent. 
Korea has the opportunity to become the green 
foundry of new technology, producing whatever 
entrepreneurs or others around the world create. 
Or Korea may choose to try to pursue proprietary 
technologies that may be behind those of other lead-
ing R&D countries.
On 6 January 2009, the government announced the 
Green New Deal, consisting of 9 major projects and 
27 affiliated projects such as improving the environ-
ment of Korea’s four major rivers, developing and 
promoting green cars and clean energy, expanding 
the recycling of waste resources and waste-to-energy 
systems, and building more eco-friendly homes. The 
Green New Deal is a set of measures to promote 
green growth and overcome the economic slowdown 
at the same time.
Under the Green New Deal, the Ministry of En-
vironment will set up a comprehensive system to 
collect and treat waste across the nation and expand 
sewage pipelines and treatment facilities to reduce 
pollutants flowing into rivers. The ministry will also 
build facilities that purify water discharged from 
sewage treatment sites and supply it to industrial 
complexes for their use. In addition, the ministry 
plans to develop technologies that can reduce pol-
lutants from cars and promote eco-friendly vehicles. 
It remains for the Ministry of Knowledge Economy 
to produce effective policies that support industries 
that can benefit from this.
Thus far, the government has put its emphasis on 
the safe treatment of municipal and industrial waste, 
3. In October 2007 Korea Associates Business Consultancy (KABC) organized the Green Dialogue Conference: A New Op-
portunity for Partnership, which was sponsored by DHL, Norske Skog, and Think UK. It was difficult to get the attention of 
the Korean authorities and especially to persuade major Korean companies to think there was value in such a partnership. 
The concern of foreign companies was that when the next round of the Kyoto Agreement is signed, Korea will have to adopt 
draconian measures without time for adequate consultation.
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but it is shifting its policy focus to recycling waste 
resources and recovering energy from waste in or-
der to address challenges from high oil prices and 
climate change. To this end, the government will in-
crease investment in recycling and waste-to-energy 
infrastructure. These days, waste and biomass are 
drawing more attention as more practical alternative 
energy sources to replace fossil fuels.
Furthermore, the ministry will recover the health of 
marine habitats and create a well-preserved water 
environment by restoring ecosystems of streams 
damaged by previous river maintenance.
Foreign Enterprises and Domestic Enterprises
The fast decline of the won and the collapse of global 
demand in many industries in the final quarter of 
2008 brought a rapid response from chief financial 
officers around the world. A quick evaluation of 
the relative profitability of operations worldwide 
showed that the Korean operation showed a re-
markably good potential compared with European 
and U.S. plants. Chinese plants were obviously 
more attractive for simple operations, but Korean 
expertise in production engineering made Korea an 
attractive location for more sophisticated products. 
In both Korea and China plants were normally more 
modern, more energy efficient, and more economical 
than in older markets.
Korean multinational corporations (MNCs) took a 
different view, which was that their most modern 
and efficient plants are in China and India; therefore, 
production was increased in those locations and 
somewhat reduced in other locations. In this respect, 
Ssangyong Motors was treated more like a Korean 
MNC, with its Chinese owners trying to walk away 
from the failing enterprise. Down to mid-February 
there had been relatively few bankruptcies and only 
one major one, the C&Heavy Industry Group, a 
rapidly growing group that had built up a leveraged 
conglomerate in a short period of time.
The largest groups of Korea seem relatively secure 
despite the global downturn. Samsung Electronics 
experienced its first quarterly loss in the final quar-
ter of 2008, and the iSamsung Group moved into 
an emergency mode in January. Hyundai Motors, 
driven by aggressive sales, continued to increase 
sales year on year in China in December and in the 
United States in January 2009. LG was less affected 
than Samsung because its worst problems stemmed 
from overproduction of memory chips at a time 
of falling demand that struck Taiwan even worse 
than Samsung. Hanwha had to withdraw its offer 
for Daewoo Shipbuilding and Engineering, as the 
leverage for purchase was just not forthcoming. In 
the same vein, Doosan was struck by the problems of 
refinancing its acquisition of Bobcat from Ingersoll 
Rand, which at $4.7 billion was the largest acquisi-
tion ever made by a Korean enterprise.
Economic Cooperation (and a Future Community?) 
with China and Japan
On 13 December 2008, the heads of state of China, 
Japan, and Korea met to discuss a common pro-
gram to handle the crisis. One of Kang Man-soo’s 
strengths was his desire to see more economic 
institutional cooperation among the three countries 
of Northeast Asia. The December summit has to 
be seen as one of the most important events in 
shaping the future of Northeast Asia. In 1997–98 
Japan had sought to create an Asian fund and had 
been squashed by the IMF. The idea was revived 
in 2000 under the more positive guidance of the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), in what became 
known as the Chiang Mai initiative. The quiet effort 
of the group working primarily on creating an Asian 
bond market that was coordinated on the margins 
of the annual ADB governors meeting (and to an 
extent on the ASEAN Plus Three meetings) was 
largely ignored by economists who followed only 
the large print.
But, by 2008, the cumulative quiet work of the 
region’s central banks set the stage for the 13 
December 2008 landmark agreement made by the 
three major countries. The countries agreed to work 
together to stabilize currencies and to reinvigorate 
their economies. From Korea’s point of view the 
agreement to increase the swap limits was impor-
tant. These swaps were extended to Southeast Asian 
countries and to refunding the ADB (something 
to which the U.S. administration is said to be op-
posed). The financial engineers of the Chiang Mai 
initiative had put together for the politicians an 
alternative view of the future of Northeast Asia 
that would be to work hard to cement the creation 
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of an economic bloc of the big three plus ASEAN. 
For now the countries agreed to make their summit 
an annual event.
Other issues on which agreements were reached 
included boosting the joint study of an FTA among 
the three countries; facilitating an investment agree-
ment; holding regular meetings between foreign 
ministry officials; establishing a cyber bureau to 
review cooperative projects in 2010; and cooperat-
ing on climate change, natural disasters, and UN 
reform. This is likely to bring the three currencies 
closer together and work to raise the value of the 
won, which might bring them into a float, as shown 
in Figure 4, with long-term consequences for the 
Hong Kong dollar.
conclusion
This review of economic policy is the story of a 
new administration coming into office with great 
ambitions but having to adapt its ideals to market 
reality. By the beginning of March 2009 the policy 
of the Lee Myung-bak administration appears to 
have evolved into a successful package that may 
serve Korea well:
• Macroeconomic policy is now closely aligned 
with economic reality, with the administration 
ready to face and react to the crisis;
• In the green and great policy, the administration 
has a winning thrust to investment that will build 
future growth; and
• In the growth of economic cooperation among 
Japan, China, Korea, and ASEAN, the founda-
tions of a future economic bloc have been laid, 
foundations that may develop rapidly if recession 
deepens in the West and if the Western institutions 
that have driven the economy for 60 years can no 
longer take the strain.
Finally, a degree of consensus based on this policy 
platform can now be found within the National As-
sembly. This should finally allow the patient work 
of the Presidential Council on National Competitive-
ness to be put on the statute book.
The Korean economy in 2009 therefore offers a 
diversity of prospects. Many are common to all 
exporting countries in terms of when developing 
countries, and especially China, will pick up the 
slack demand for exports. Korea is exceptionally 
well placed to take advantage of this when it hap-
pens, but the timing remains unclear in late February 
2009. If Korea’s growth is not led by its exports, then 
the question is whether the new economic team, ap-
pointed in January 2009, can make a difference and 
reinstill the Korean people’s confidence that can lead 
toward a marginally positive growth rate.
Or can the region begin to function as a single unit 
with consequent extensive shifts in economic struc-
ture based on comparative economic advantage, with 
changes in trading patterns and a closer concentra-
tion on trade within the region that runs at about 40 
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On 22 February 2009, the Chiang Mai group took a 
further step forward by increasing the mutual fund 
from $80 billion to $120 billion and proposing to 
triple the ADB’s capital. The proposal to increase 
the capital of ADB may create the first Asia-U.S. 
conflict because the United States holds a 12 per-
cent stake in the ABD and has resisted attempts to 
increase its funding since 2005.
It is hard to persuade Koreans about the exceptional 
opportunities that this development offers the Ko-
rean economy and to underestimate the degree to 
which this represents a changed Korea. Those who 
forecast the long-term development of a Northeast 
Asian bloc had expected this to be a gradual evolu-
tion over 10 to 15 years, not a matter of months.
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percent of total trade rising toward European levels 
of 60 percent plus? The answers to these questions 
will give a growth rate in 2010 that currently must 
range from 1–2 percent up to 4–5 percent.
Dr. Michell is President of Korea Associates Busi-
ness Consultancy Ltd. in Seoul. He is also a visiting 
professor at the KDI School of Policy and Manage-
ment.
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